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WHAT ABOUT 
COMMUNISM? 
By ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER. Jr. 
"A SPECTER is haunting Europe," wrote Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels just over one hundred years ago, "-the 
specter of Communism." Today~a century after the first 
publication of the Communist Manifesto-that specter is 
haunting, not just Europe, but the world. 
Our response to that specter has too often been that of 
children running panic-stricken from a haunted house-a 
response compounded of terror, hysteria and fear. Such a 
response is dangerous for democracies which wish to survive 
the Communist challenge. It is dangerous because free peo-
ple should not believe in ghosts; if they do, they slip into a 
subtle bondage which erodes the foundations of good sense 
and equanimity on which their freedom rests. It is danger-
ous, too, because frightened people are not capable of making 
intelligent decisions and of adopting stern and consistent 
policies. 
The first answer to the specter of Communism, then, is to 
divest it of its spectral qualities. For Communism is not an 
invisible ghostly power. It is a movement created by men, 
operated by men, and subject to the same frailties and limita-
tions as all other man-made movements. The first answer, in 
other words, is to achieve in our own minds a realistic picture 
of the nature of the Communist challenge. Facts remain the 
best antidote to hysteria. 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. is Associa te Professor of History at Harvard 
University and author of The Age of Jackson . 
Copyright, 1950, by The Public Affairs Committee, Incorporated 
- a non profit , educational organization-
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THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST 
MOVEMENT 
THE word "communism" originally referred to systems of 
social organization under which goods were held in common. 
In this sense, some form of communism may be said to have 
been practiced by the early Christians; and in this sense, the 
-'====~~~~~~~~II~fi~ tendency toward he ommon 
_ ownership of 
property has been 
a recurrent fea-
ture of extremist 
groups, often reli-
gious in their in-
spirations, such as 
the Anabaptists in 
16th century Ger-
many and the Lev-
ellers and Diggers 
in 17th century 
Britain. Commu-
nism also has a 
traditional mean-
ing in economics: a society organized on the princi pIe of 
"from each accordip.g to his ability; to each according to his 
creed." The communist economy in this sense exists only 
in theory. 
But Communism, as the word is usually used today, has a 
generally accepted political . and economic meaning. In 
ordinary usage it refers to a society in which the economy is 
owned by the state and controlled by a "dictatorship of the 
proletariat" as depicted in the writings of Marx and Lenin. 
Specifically it refers to the kind of political and economic 
system existing in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
Outgrowth of Industrial Revolution 
The Industrial Revolution in the 18th and 19th centuries 
transformed the face of the western world. In place of a 
static system, based on agriculture, handicrafts and local 
trade, came a new impersonal, dynamic system, increasingly 
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based on mass production, mass distribution, mass labor. 
The industrial workingman began to lose a sense of a crea-
tive connection with his work. No longer working in- his 
own home, no longer owning his tools, no longer having any 
rights to the products of his own labor, he began to feel 
himself almost as anonymous a factor in the process of produc-
tion as the machine he tended. Huddled with his fellows in 
the noisome slums of the new industrial cities, divorced from 
any stable contact with the community, he felt homeless 
and alone. . 
The result was a deep and searing discontent, always 
threatening to burst out in actual violence. The result, too 
was a determined effort on the part of some of the dis-
contented to analyze the causes of their difficulties and sug-
gest a way out. The most impressive of these analysts was 
Karl Marx, a German thinker and writer. In 1847, when 
Marx was not quite thirty years old, he and his friend Fried-
. rich Engels set down their social ideas in a clear and ordered 
way. On the eve of the Revolution of 1848, Marx and Engels 
published what they called the Communist Manifesto. 
Marx and Hegel 
Marx's thinking had been 
.deeply influenced by the work 
of the German philosopher 
Hegel. From Hegel, Marx bor-
rowed in particular the notion 
of the dialectic: that is, the 
theory that history is a process 
of eternal unfolding and 
change, where at each moment 
the existing set of conditions 
(thesis) produces an inevitable 
reaction (antithesis), where 
each contradition between the-
sis and antithesis results in a 
synthesis, and where each syn-
thesis in turn becomes itself a new thesis, recommencing the 
eternal process of development on a new and higher level. 
But, where Hegel was what is known technically as a philo-
sophical idealist-that is, a philosopher who believed that 
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ideas were the ultimate reality-Marx was a philosophical 
materialist, believing that the primary reality. was to be 
found in material conditions. Marx, as he said, stood Hegel 
on his head. Out of this exercise he derived the doctrine of 
dialectical materialism. 
In the Communist Manifesto} Marx and Engels applied 
the doctrine of dialectical materialism to history. As ma-
terialists, -they argued that the prevailing ideas in any his-
torical epoch, as well as the 
prevailing forms of social or-
ganization, were determined by 
its method of economic produc-
tion and exchange. They ar-
gued that, after the dissolution 
of primitive tribal commu-
nism, civilization had been a 
history of struggles between 
exploiting and exploited, rul-
ing and oppressed classes. 
The doctrine of the dialec-
tic provided the clue to histori-
cal change. Each t;:lass society, 
as Marx and Engels saw it, 
constituted a thesis, whose ex-
istence provoked the inevitable antithesis in the shape of a 
class rising in revolt. In the long course of history, the dia-
lectical process had finally reduced the warring societies to 
two-the middle class and the workers, the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat; the world was approaching the final stage of 
the class dialectic; and the triumph of the working class 
would produce the climactic synthesis-a classless society, 
emancipating the world forever from all exploitation, op-
pression, class distinctions and class struggles. 
The Rise of Marxism 
Marx had great admiration for the achievements of capital-
ism. "The bourgeoisie," he wrote, "during its rule of scarce 
one hundred years, has created more massive and more colos-
sal productive forces than have all preceding generations to-
gether." But he felt that the bourgeoisie had discharged its 
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historic mission in liquidating the last remnants of feudal-
ism; and that capitalism itself now promised to become almost 
as great a fetter upon productive forces as feudalism had 
been three centuries earlier. 
Capitalism, Marx said, contains the seeds of its own des-
truction. As wealth is accumulated in the hands of a few, 
as economic power grows increasingly concentrated, the gap 
widens between the ever more prosperous rich and the ever 
more wretched poor. As productive forces expand, society is 
recurrently threatened by crises of overproduction; and the 
capitalists can maintain their position only by enforced des-
truction of a mass of productive forces or by the conquest of 
new markets. Each new economic crisis is worse than the 
one before; each widens the gap between the wealth of the 
property-holders and the poverty of the proletariat; each 
brings the revolution nearer; yet recurrent crisis is inherent 
in the system. "What the bourgeoisie therefore produces 
above all," wrote Marx and Engels, "are its own grave-diggers. 
The Communist 
Manifesto trans-
formed the nature ~ 
of the revolution- i ....  
ary movement, .... . 
supplying it with . 
an impressive the-~
ore tical basis in 
economics and his-
tory. In his famous 
three volume 
work Das Kapital 
(1867, 1885, 1895) 
Marx amplified 
his analysis of cap-
italist society. He 
had a powerful in-
telligence, com-
prehensive in its 
grasp and remorseless in its operations if narrow in its per-
spective. Though time has proved many of his predictions 
and conclusions to be wrong, a good .. deal of his basic analysis 
is now generally accepted. 
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Marx was not just an armchair theoretician. In addition 
to his long weary hours of study in the British Museum, he 
was active in the politics of the revolutionary movement. As 
a pamphleteer, he was hard-hitting; as a politician, he was 
determined; and, under his fierce, hectoring leadership the 
revolutionary movement was reorganized in Germany, at 
least, and set on an international foundation. In 1864 he 
helped found the International Workingmen's Association 
or First International. 
Gradualism versus Violence 
In the half century between the formation of the First 
International and the start of the First World War, the 
Marxist movement engaged in a series of internal debates 
which resulted in 
a broad division o£ 
Marxists between 
·those who thought 
that the revolution 
could be brought 
about by peaceful 
methods and those 
who thought it re-
q uired violence. 
Marx himself had 
never excluded the 
possibility that in 
some situations vio-
I lence would be nec-
essary to bring 
about the revolu-
tion. "We do not maintain that the means of attaining this 
objective are everywhere the same," he observed in a speech 
at the Hague in 1872. "We know that we must take into 
consideration the institutions, the habits and the customs of 
different regions, and we do not deny that there are countries 
like America, England-and if I knew your institutions better 
I would perhaps add Holland-where the workers can attain 
their objects by peaceful means. But such is not the case in 
all other countries." The revolutionary uprising of the Paris 
Com~une (1871), indeed, frightened the more moderate 
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followers of Marx. Along with the conflict between Marx 
and Bakunin, the Russian apostle of direct action, it con-
tributed to the break-up of the First International in 1876. 
In 1889 representatives of the various Socialist parties of 
Europe gathered in Paris to found the Second International. 
Though these parties retained the rhetoric of revolution, their 
actual temper was significantly different. They were hard-
working, sober men, veterans of the patient, day-to-day strug-
gle to .enlarge the political and economic power of their 
comrades. The failure of the workers' revolts of 1848 and 
1871 had discouraged them about the possibilities of violent 
revolution. At the same time, it was beginning to look to 
them as if some of Marx's more drastic predictions' in the 
Communist Manifesto were not working out. 
Capitalism, for example, appeared to be neither so unstable 
nor so unendurable as Marx had prophesied. The poor, in-
stead of growing ever more poor, were becoming perceptibly 
better off. The working class was gaining the vote and there-
by a new access t9 political power, while at the same time 
it was forging its own tools of peaceful economic change in 
trade unions and cooperatives. The state, instead of being 
merely the naked instrument of capitalist oppression, showed 
possibilities of becoming an instrument by which the non-
business classes might control the business community and 
even bring about, through taxation, some redistribution of 
wealth. All this encouraged Socialists in countries where 
capitalism had matured to place increasing faith in political 
action. 
Democratic Socialism 
Developments in Great Britain gave an especially powerful 
impetus to gradualism. British conservatism was given an 
unusual freedom for maneuver by the wealth of its colonial 
empire; and, under the influence of the "Tory Democracy" 
of Disraeli, it was able through judicious economic and 
political concessions to remove the revolutionary edge from 
British labor discontent. This experience gave British socia-
lists a conviction that they could reach their goals by demo-
cratic means. As early as 1883 a group of influential intel· 
lectuals found~d the Fabian Society, dedicated to the achieve~ 
ment of socialism by practical and pieceip.eal reform. The 
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Fabians never regarded themselves as Marxists in a strict sense. 
But during the same period the Marxist parties of the Con-
tinent-the Socialist Parties of France and Italy and the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany, as well as the smaller socialist 
parties of the Low Countries and Scandinavia-became in-
fected by a similar faith in peaceful, democratic change. 
Th us one wing of Marxism was developing a tradition of 
democratic socialism. In Eastern Europe, however, Marxism 
was assuming a different form. Here the revolutionaries were 
confronted, not by a relatively wise and conciliatory ruling 
class, as in Britain, but by an oppressive and reactionary 
autocracy. In self defense, they themselves became equally 
violent and extremist. Russia in particular had a long tradi-
tion both of desperate conspiracy and of savage repression. 
~eninls Influence 
The Russian Social Democratic party was formerly organ-
ized in 1898, some years after Marx's death. Its most power-
ful figure was an able, highly intelligent and dedicated man 
named Lenin. Lenin's older brother had been executed in 
1887 for plotting to assassinate Tsar Alexander III. Lenin 
himself had a passionate conviction that Russia could not 
be liberated without violence. He thereupon grafted the 
Russian conspiratorial tradition upon Marxism, advancing 
the thesis that the success of the revolution required the 
formation of a "revolutionary vanguard," controlling a highly 
disci plined party. 
Although Lenins ideas were perhaps an inevitable response 
to Russian conditions, they were obviously different from 
those of the mass-based, parlimentary parties of the western 
Socialists. Indeed, some of Lenin's views provoked strong 
opposition from other Russian Marxists. As Leon Trotsky 
later observed in a fleeting moment of insight, Lenin's em-
phasis on centralized control could only lead to a situation 
where "the organization of the Party takes the place of the 
Party itself; the Central Committee takes the place of the 
organization; and finally the dictator takes the place of the 
Central Committee." But Lenin won in 1903 a temporary 
victory over his opponents within the Russian Social Demo-
cratic party. His group became known as the Bolsheviki 
8 
(members of the majority), while his opponents were now 
called the Mensheviki (members of the minority) . 
The Russian Revolution 
On the eve of the First World 
War, the main currents of Marx-
ism had already diverged. Both 
the democratic Socialists and 
the Bolsheviks had started with 
Karl Marx, but they had gone 
off in opposite directions. The 
democratic Socialists were com-
mitted to gradualism; the Bol-
sheviks to the thesis that prole-
tarian victory was impossible 
except under the leadership of 
a disciplined band of profession-
al revolutionaries pledged to 
destroy the existing order by 
violence. In his pamphlet State 
and Revolution (1917) Lenin 
~IENUN 
......... 
f J • 
rejected even the partial gradualism of Marx. "The replace-
ment of the bourgeois by the proletarian state," he flatly said, 
"is impossible without a violent revolution." 
The war itself completed the separation between the two 
schools of Marxists. Lenin's overthrow of the middle-of-the-
road Kerensky regime in November 1917 brought the Bol-
sheviks to power. And the assumption of power-the estab-
lishment of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" -accelerated 
the transformation of Bolshevism. At the beginning, political 
and trade-union groups were allowed some freedom of action 
in Communist Russia. But, under the spur both of foreign 
intervention and of internal necessity, Lenin felt that re-
pressive measures were necessary. In 1921, when the sailors 
of Kronstadt revolted, demanding freedom of political action 
for all left-wing parties, freedom of assembly for trade unions, 
and the secret ballot for workers and peasants, Lenin sent 
Trotsky and the Red Army to crush them by force. Soon 
afterwards the last traces of open political opposition dis-
appeared. 
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Growth of State Power 
A totalitarian state may be defined as a society in which the 
state recognizes no limitations in its power over the indivi-
dual. "Nothing against the state, nothing outside the state," 
said Mussolini; and, in practice, this means that the single 
party of the totalitarian state becomes identical with the 
upper levels of the state bureaucracy, and that all institutions 
within society are either absorbed into the state-party or 
destroyed by it. The fascist and Communist state structures 
differ in important respects. Communism involves state 
ownership of commerce and industry while fascism retains 
th~ structure of private ownership. But the two political 
systems are similar in the relationship they create between 
the all-powerful state, the secret police and the single party, 
on the one hand, and the powerless individuaJ on the other. 
F or a time the power of the Soviet state was limited by 
Lenin's own self-restraint. But his exaltation of the Com-
munist Party and his suppression of all organized opposition 
created the institutional foundations for an all-powerful 
state; and his successor, the stolid, nerveless, implacable 
Stalin, had none of Lenin's compunctions. Stalin moved to 
destroy all possible rivals. Of Lenin's original politburo, only 
Lenin died naturally and only Stalin survives: of the others, 
Kamenev, Zinoviev and Sokolnikov were executed; Bubnov 
mysteriously disappeared; Trotsky was assassinated in exile. 
Under Stalin's leadership, the Soviet regime has achieved 
great successes in the economic transformation of the coun-
try. But the formidable economic achievements were accom-
panied by systematic efforts to stamp out not only overt 
political opposition, but also all suspicions of political dis-
agreement, all intellectual doubts, all hints of reservation. 
Nor did Stalin stop with political and econ~mic ideas. 
Science, art, music, poetry, every field of intellectual endeavor 
had to conform to the party line. As thorough-going as Nazi 
Germany, Communist Russia has been equally successful in 
the destruction of cultural freedom. 
The Soviet experience completed the transformation of 
Bolshevik Marxism into an all-pervasive religion. In spite 
of the positive achievements of the Soviet Union, the Com-
munist commitment to an all-powerful state increased the 
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mistrust and hostility of the democratic socialists. And, for 
their part, the Communists looked with contempt upon t:he 
Socialists as milk-and-water characters, more interested in 
averting than in hastening the revolution. Though tactical 
considerations from time to time led Lenin to collaborate 
with moderate groups, he never ceased (as he boasted quite 
openly in his pamphlet Left Wing Communism: An Infan-
tile Disorder) in his efforts to undermine and destroy them. 
It was in this spirit that Lenin urged the British Communists 
to back the Laborite Arthur Henderson: "I wanted to support 
Henderson with my vote in the same way as a rope supports 
the hanged." So bitter, indeed, was the Communist hatred 
of the Socialists that in Germany, before Hitler came , to 
power, Communists even worked with Nazis in campaigns 
against Socialists collaborating in bourgeois governments. 
STAGES IN COMMUNIST POLICY 
FOR Lenin, Communism meant world revolution; and in 
1919 he founded the Third or Communist International 
(called for short the Comintern) as the general headquarters 
for international Communism. 
Through the Comintern, and the famous "21 points" laid 
down as conditions for affiliation with the Comintem, Rus-
sian Communists were able to control the policies of the 
subsidiary Communist parties. As the Comintern has pro-
posed, the local Communist leadership has disposed; and" 
when Comm unist leaders ignored or defied Comin tern 
directives, they did not last long as Communist leaders. 
Students of the Comintern have distinguished several distinct 
stages of Soviet foreign policy, each of which has been faith-
fully reproduced by the local Communist parties. 
I. Immediate world revolution (1917-23~. In the first 
flush of revolutionary enthusiasm, the Soviet leaders looked 
for a chain reaction of revolutions through the world. 
2. Rapprochement and agitation (1923-28). But the de-
feat of Communist uprisings in Bavaria, in Hungary, in 
Poland showed that Communism was not ready to take 
power by force. Nor could the Soviet Union itself, struggling 
hard to stay above water, afford to mobilize all capitalism 
against it. So the Soviet Union established formally good 
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STALIN 
relations with foreign countries. 
In some cases, as in China, it 
even abandoned the more mili-
tant elements of the Commu-
nist party. Anti-capitalist agita-
tion, however, continued. 
3. Renewal of extremism 
(1928-34). In 1927 and 1928 
Stalin began to emerge triumph-
ant from the struggle for suc-
cession which followed the death 
of Lenin. In order to unite the 
people behind the Stalin re-
gime and the five year plan the 
Comintern began to emphasize 
again the immediate dangers of 
capitalist aggression. The Com-
munist parties in Europe turned against the democratic so-
cialists, who were called "social fascists" and regarded as 
agents of capitalism. In some instances, Communists even 
collaborated briefly with fascists on the theory that fascism 
could not last and that it would only prepare the way for 
Communism. 
4. Popular front (1934-39): The power and durability of 
the Hitler regime soon revealed the error of this assumption. 
The Comintern swiftly reversed itself and ordered the Com-
munist parties to join with all other anti-fascist forces in a 
popular front. 
5. Imperialist war (1939-41). After the capitulation of 
Britain and France at Munich in 1938, the Soviet Union, 
fearing that Hitler might now turn to the East, began secret 
negotiations with Nazi Germany. These negotiations cul-
minated in the Russo-German pact of August 1939. Even 
veteran Communists found trouble in making this adjust-
ment. "To stand aside from this conflict, to contribute only 
revolutionary-sounding phrases while the fascists beasts ride 
roughshod over Europe," wrote the British Communist leader 
Harry Pollitt, "would be betrayal of everything our fore-
bears have fought to achieve." For expressing such senti-
ments, Pollitt was removed from the party leadership until 
he was ready to recant and join in obstructing the anti-Nazi 
1·2 
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war effort. For two years, the Communist Party in Britain 
conducted an anti-war agitation which included, in the words 
of Harold J. Laski, "an insistence that the responsibility for 
the war lay on the shoulders of Great Britain which was 
guilty of aggression against Hitlerite Germany, the encourage-
ment of sabotage in the armament factories, and the use of 
the manifold disasters suffered by Great Britain after the fall 
of France to insist that the prolongation of the war would 
destroy the working class." Walther Ullbricht, a German . 
Communist leader, ordered German Communists to betray 
anti-N azis to the Gestapo. American Communists bitterly 
denounced Franklin D. Roosevelt and his policy of aiding . 
the enemies of Hitler. 
6. Anti-Fascist War (1941-45). Hitler's attack on Russia 
suddenly revived the popular front. The USSR fought mag-
nificently during the war; and the Communist parties in the 
West collaborated loyally in the war efforts of their homeland. 
In 1943 the Comintern was officially dissolved. 
7. Soviet Expansionism (1945- ). In 1945, shortly 
after Yalta, the Soviet Union abandoned its wartime policy 
of cooperation with the West, and began to tighten its poli-
tical and economic controls in Eastern Europe. This in-
volved a revival of policies of revolutionary extremism. So-
cialists once again became an enemy of the Communists; 
and Walther Ullbricht, still a German Communist leader, 
invited former Nazis to join him in the battle against the 
west. For a time the Soviet Union sought to hide its objec-
tives under the pretence that it was assisting the "national 
revolutions" allegedly demanded by the masses of such coun-
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tries as Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia. But the formation 
in 1947 of the Cominform reasserted direct Soviet control 
over the national parties; and the subsequent break with 
Tito in Yugoslavia showed that the Soviet Union was indif-
ferent or hostile to "national revolutions" except when accom-
panied by governments aligned with Soviet foreign policy. 
The one consistent factor in all the twists and turns of the 
international Communist line has remained, of course, the 
interests of the Soviet Union. Whatever the idealism of indi-
vidual Communists, the practical effect of the world Com-
munist movement is that of a tool-and, next to the Red 
Army, the most powerful tool-of the Soviet foreign policy. 
But the non-Communist world must remember that it can, 
by its own policies and actions, increase or reduce the potency 
of this mighty Soviet weapon. For wherever injustice, pov-
erty and racial discrimination exist in capitalist or socialist 
countries, there exists fertile ground for the divisive and 
disruptive activities of international Communism. 
THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Beginnings of American Communism 
~HE United States has a strong and wholesome tradition 
of native radicalism. A nation born in revolution, its great 
heroes-Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln-have stood 
for the iiberation of man from oppression. Extreme radical 
movements, though always hated by the conservatives of their 
time, have made invaluable contributions to the building of 
America. Before the First World War, America was even 
developing a strong native Socialist tradition under the 
leadership of the much-loved Hoosier Eugene V. Debs. In 
1912 Debs polled almost 6 per cent of the presidential vote. 
But the First World War split the Socialist Party into pro-. 
war and anti-war factions. In 1918 the Russian Revolution 
introduced new confusions. Left-wing members of the old 
Socialist Party rushed to commit themselves to Communism; 
and two splinter parties appeared in September 1919, both 
proclaimed their loyalty to the Bolshevik Revolution. Then 
the famous "red scare," accentuated by the politically ambi-
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tious Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, drove most Com-
munist activity underground. Eventually the rival factions 
got together and 
es ta1blished the 
American Commu-
nist Party as an open 
political group un-
der the name of the 
Workers Party. 
The American 
Communist Party 
made little head-
way during the 
twenties. In 1924 
it tried · to invade 
the Progressive 
movement of Sen-
ator Robert M. La-
Follette. But La-
Follette, a stalwart 
representative of 
native American 
• 
radicalism, angrily rebuffed the Communists, announcing 
his belief that "all Progressives should refuse to participate in 
any movement which makes common cause with any Com-
munist organization." 
The Communists were further weakened in the twenties 
by the activities of party members who demanded a certain 
independence from Moscow, or who allied themselves with 
anti-government leaders (especially Bukharin) in Moscow. 
Some of these leaders espoused what was known as the doc-
trine of "American exceptionalism" -i.e., the theory that 
special circumstances in the United States, particularly the 
vigor of American capitalism, required some modification 
within this country of international communist strategies-
and they won considerable support within the Party. In 
1929, indeed, Jay Lovestone, a leading "American exception-
alist," was elected party leader. Despite the open interven-
tion of the Comintern representatives, brandishing cables 
from Moscow, the majority persisted in t.heir support of 
Lovestone. Lovestone was later called to Moscow, where 
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he appealed from the Comintern's decision. The appeal was 
rejected and Lovestone was asked to endorse the new party 
line. When he refused, he was expelled from the party. 
The Depression Years 
In May, 1929, Stalin issued an important directive to the 
American Communists. "I consider the Communist Party 
of the United States," he said, "one of the Communist parties 
to which history has given decisive tasks from the point of 
view of the world revolutionary movement. The revolution-
ary crisis has not yet reached the United States, but we already 
have knowledge of numerous facts which suggest that it is 
approaching .... You must forge real revolutionary cadres 
and leaders of the proletariat who will be capable of leading 
the millions of American workers toward the revolutionary 
class wars." 
Six months later the great depression began. The Com-
munists now had their great opportunity. But the depression 
coincided with the third phase of Soviet strategy-the period 
of revolutionary extremism. And, of course, the American 
Communist Party hewed to the party line. In Toward Soviet 
America (1932) William Z. Foster called for the proletarian 
revolution. "Under the dictatorship of the proletariat," he 
wrote, "all the capitalist parties-Republicans, Democrats, 
Progressives, Socialists, etc.-will be liquidated, the Com-
munist Party alone functioning as the Party of the toiling 
masses." When Franklin D. Roosevelt launched the New 
Deal in 1933, the Communists denounced him as the leader 
of a "social fascist" regime. 
But the Americans wanted the New Deal; they did not 
want revolutionary extremism. Consequently the American 
Communists in 1935 turned with relief to the new "united 
front" line. This strategy now permitted Communists to 
"collaQorate" with the liberal movement. The process of 
"collaboration" in the "united front" gave the Communists 
their most extensive influence in the United States. 
It is important to remember the mood of the middle 
thirties. We were still near the bottom of the greatest de-
pression in our history. Franklin D. Roosevelt had only 
begun the long process of restoring to a despairing America 
a faith in its own future. The trade unions were at the very 
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beginning of their bitter fight to organize the mass industries. 
In many parts of the country racial tensions were acute. 
Communists threw themselves into the firing line with great 
courage. They were prominent on the picket lines; they 
fought side by side with Negroes in their struggle for fair 
treatment; many individual Communists were models of 
selflessness and devotion. 
At the same time, the rise of fascism abroad put Commun-
ism in an even more attractive light. Once the Communists 
were convinced that Nazism would last, they became un-
swerving in their opposition to Hitler. Litvinov in Geneva 
called on the League of Nations to stop the spread of aggres-
sion. The national Communist parties sought cooperation 
with all anti-fascist groups. 
The tragedy of Spain had a particularly strong impact on 
American liberals. In 1936 a group of fascist generals, led 
by Francisco Franco and very shortly backed by Geiman and 
Italian planes and arms, began a revolution against the con-
stitutional govern-
ment of Spain. Far-
sighted men, in-
cluding such con-
servatives as Henry 
L. Stimson in the 
United States and 
Winston Churchill 
in Britain, soon 
came to see that 
Hitler and Musso-
lini regarded Spain 
as a testing-ground 
for a new world 
war. But Britain 
and France (and 
the United States) 
refused to help the 
Loyalist government in its fight against Fascism. Only the 
Soviet Union appeared to recognize the extreme gravity of 
the situation. The Spanish Civil War finally convinced 
many young men of the virtue of the Communist cause, 
despite many questionable actions by the Russians toward 
17 
non-Communist, anti-Fascist groups. Many Americans, acting 
out of honorable and generous motives, worked with the 
Communists during this period. Some even joined the Party. 
N ever had the American Communists advocated policies 
which seemed so to correspond with the interests of the United 
States as in their pre-pact opposition to the Nazis and their 
plea for support of the Spanish Republic from 1936 to 1939. 
In this period, too, the anti-Communist campaign was carried 
on in a crude and reckless manner. The (Dies) Committee 
on Un-American Activities, appeared to be much more in-
terested in slandering and smearing liberals than they did 
in exposing real Communists. "Red-baiting," indeed, seemed 
to many people to be just another device by which reaction-
aries sought to resist necessary social reform. 
Life in the Communist Party 
What kind of men and women were the American Com-
munists? People joined the Communist Party for many rea-
sons. Some were idealists, anxious to speed social reform to 
oppose fascism. Some were lonely; the Party provided them 
with friends. Some had a grudge against society; the Party 
endowed that grudge with dignity. Some lived drab, frus-
trated lives; the Party gave to their lives color and excitement. 
Some were afraid; the Party pledged them the aid of history. 
Some felt excluded from the life of their community; the 
Party gave them a home. Some craved a faith in 'lvhich to 
believe; the Party consecrated them to a living religion. Some 
sought power; the Party promised them the future. And for 
most of these, the harsh Party discipline was no obstacle. 
It was rather an indispensable part of the attraction-it was 
simply the outward expression of the inner unity and solidity 
which had an irresistible appeal for the overidealistic, for 
the weak in heart, for the ambitious, and for the casualties 
of the industrial order. Systems which exercise dictatorial 
authority over the intellect of men attract fanatical followers: 
It is not surprising that Communism sheltered fugitives from 
the intellectual insecurity of modern times. 
Thus a variety of motives brought people into the Party. 
Every attempt at strike-breaking, every race riot, every lynch-
ing was likely to increase Party membership. But the signifi-
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cant thing was the tremendous overturn within the Alnerican 
Communist Party. Few Americans could endure for very 
long the tense and unreal life of the Party member. After 
they had a taste of the centralization, the fanaticism, the 
overriding loyalty to the interests of a foreign power, they 
got out. That is why one-time membership in the Communist 
Party, especially if it happened before 1939, should not be 
regarded as a life-time disqualification. It was rather those 
who survived every new direction of the Party line, who 
obeyed every new caprice of Party discipline, who accepted 
the Party's claim to rule every aspect of their lives, to dictate 
their religion, their science and their art as . well as their 
politics-it was this hard core of fanatics which made up the 
serious part of the Communist movement in America. 
For the American Communists were far shrewder and 
more determined than the high-minded liberals who worked 
with them. Lenin had long since instructed his followers 
that no holds were barred in the class war. "If need be," he 
declared, "Communists must be prepared to resort to all 
sorts of stratagems, maneuvers, and illegal methods, to eva-
sion and subterfuges in order to penetrate the trade unions, 
to remain in them and to carry on Communist work in them 
at all costs." The American Communist Party did not sus-
pend for a moment its secret efforts to entrench Party mem-
bers and reliable fellow travelers in strategic positions in the 
trade unions and in the liberal movement. It was a favorite 
Communist tactic to plant secret members on the staff, say, 
of an organization dedicated to some good liberal cause, and 
then to manipulate the organization in th~ Communist inter-
est, often with the help of the disciplined work of a secret 
Communist caucus among the membership. 
In the same way attempts were made to slip secret Party 
members into the government. Underground cells were set 
up in Washington for espionage purposes. Whittaker Cham-
bers has confessed to being a key figure in the Communist 
spy apparatus; and he had systematic contact with at least 
one impressionable young man in the government who turned 
over official documents to him for transmission to Moscow. 
Underneath the facade of the "united front," the Communist 
Party pursued its own special objectives. 
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The War 
The Moscow trials of 1936 and 1937, on top of the growing 
mistrust of Communist methods in America, troubled many 
liberals. Then came the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and in its wake 
many left the Party. The functionaries, of course, execute the 
turnabout with neat efficiency. Earl Browder, the party leader, 
who a few weeks before had been ridiculing the notion of 
such a pact, now became a bitter opponent of aid to the anti-
fascist forces in Europe. In 1940 the Communists savagely 
denounced Roosevelt as a war-monger. Browder was cry-
ing, "The new Roosevelt course is essentially for America 
the same direction which Hitler gave for Germany in 1933." 
With June 22, 1941, and the attack on Russia, came a new 
turnabout. The Communists suddenly became great cham-
pions of war production and supporters of "no strike" pledges. 
From obstructing the military effort, the Communists sud-
denly staged a violent campaign for the immediate opening 
of a second front in Europe. Earl Browder became a par-
ticularly strong advocate of cooperation with all groups. 
Following the dissolution of the Comintern, the American 
Communist Party was dissolved in 1944, and replaced by the 
Communist Political Association. 
Events demonstrated that Browder was just one more vic-
tim of "American exceptionalism." When the military crisis 
in Europe receded in February 1945, the Soviet Union saw 
no reason to continue the wartime policy of collaboration 
with all anti-fascist groups. In the April 1945 issue of Cahiers 
du CommunismeJ an organ of the French Communist Party, 
the French Communist Jacques Duclos announced the end 
of collaboration and the begining of the post-war party line. 
Duclos made it abundantly clear that Browder had mistaken 
a temporary war-time tactic for a permanent strategy. 
After the War 
Browder's many enemies in the Communist movement 
took advantage of the Duclos article first to drive him from 
the leadership and then to expel him from the party. One 
after another Communist leaders who had supported Browder 
rose in party meeting to confess their sins and recant their 
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errors. Under a new leadership, with the aging William Z. 
Foster as nominal head and Eugene Dennis as the executive 
secretary, the Communist Party was reconstituted. 
The Communist post-war strategy with its renewal of 
revolutionary extremism, meant once again the isolation of 
Communists from the main streams of American life. Brow-
der's war-time policy had won many recruits for the party. 
Many more people, inexplicably forgetting the Communist 
record from 1939 to 1941, thought they could work with 
Communists in a relationship of mutual confidence. But the 
new party line required an ever sharper commitment of 
Communists to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. 
Eugene Dennis, as early as July 1945, told the Communist 
National Committee, that it would be "necessary from now 
on to create the conditions and base for organizing a major 
third party nationally." In February 1946 he said that the 
party should be established in time for the 1948 elections, 
and that first steps toward its formation should be taken 
early in 1947. The Communist pressure for a third party 
was reinforced by other pressures. The Progressive Party was 
formed late in 1947 and later nominated Henry Wallace as 
its candidate for President. Though the candidates and many 
of the leaders of the Progressive Party were by no means 
Communists, the Communists were a dominant faction In 
the party and had their way on controversial points. 
Present Role of the Communist Party 
Since the war, the Communists, as a result of their sponsor-
ship of the Progressive Party, their opposition to the Marshall 
Plan, and their unquestioning endorsement of Soviet foreign 
policy, have backed themselves into an exposed and vulner-
able position. With the rise to power of Philip Murray and 
Walter Reuther, the anti-Communist forces in the CIO 
gained vigorous leadership. With the formation of Ameri-
cans for Democratic Action, liberals who believed in a "non-
Communist left" acquired an organization of their own. 
As a result, open Communist influence dwindled into 
negligibility. The American Communist Party itself, never 
an important influence in American politics, was feebler than 
ever. The Communist youth movement folded, arid its mem-
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bers were ordered to work with the Young Progressives of 
America. Genuine "front" organizations-that is, organiza~ 
tions controlled for Party purposes and identifiable by the 
presence in key positions of leading Communists and by 
their failure to deviate from the Party line-lost support. 
N or were the Communists any more successful in their 
attempts to seize power in non-Communist organizations. 
The Communist faction was badly beaten in the American 
Veterans Committee. The Communist power in the CIO 
was steadily whittled away. The National Maritime Union 
and the Transport Workers, both of whom had followed the 
party line for years, broke away_ Following its annual con-
vention in Cleveland in 1949, the CIO set in motion pro-
cedures which culminated in the expulsion of most of the 
alleged Communist-controlled unions. 
Thus open Communist activity, whether under the party 
banner or through "front" organizations or through the 
attempt to capture non-Communist organizations, seemed 
by 1950 to be declining. But not all Communist activity was 
in the open. And it is the central and habitual dishonesty-
the belief ·that the end justifies the means-which have in 
great part created the Communist problem. As the late 
Harold Laski said, "T>he passion for conspiracy, the need for 
deception, the ruthlessness, the centralized and autocratic 
commands, the contempt for fair play, the willingness to use 
lying and treachery to discredit an opponent or to sec¥re 
some desired end, complete dishonesty in the presentation of 
facts, the habit of regarding temporary success as justifying 
any measure, the hysterical invective by which they wrought 
to destroy the character of anyone who disagreed with them; 
these, in the context of an idolization of leaders who might, 
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the day after, be mercilessly attacked as the incarnation of 
evil, have been the normal behaviour of Communists all 
over the world." 
"For years, in this country," Eleanor Roosevelt has written 
about the Communists, "they taught the philosophy of the 
lie. They taught that allegiance to the Party and acceptance 
of orders from Party heads, whose interests were not just 
those of the United States, were paramount ... Because I 
have experienced the deception of the Amelican Commu-
nists, I will not trust them." 
COMMUNISM AND FREE SOCIETY 
The existence of a group like the American Communists 
poses difficult questions to a free society. The American 
people have been debating these questions for years, in many 
cases without reaching settled conclusions. Such complex 
problems cannot be solved here. But, in order to aid the 
reader in formulating his own answers, a number of con-
siderations are set forth in the following pages, which should 
be borne in mind in any discussion of the problems of Com-
munism and free society. 
How Do You Tell a Communist 
The word "Communist" has a specific meaning. It means 
a member of the Communist party. The word "fellow 
traveler" also has a specific meaning. It means a man who, 
without being an actual party member, follows the party line 
faithfully, especially on questions of foreign policy. In re-
sponsible discussion these words should be used in these 
senses, and no other. But the problem is rendered more 
difficult by the fact that many conservatives are less interested 
in identifying genuine Communists than in smearing liberals 
as Communists, and by the additional fact, that many Com-
munists and fellow travelers do their best to conceal their 
political affiliations. The question then arises: is there any 
way in which Communists and fellow travelers who pose as 
ordinary liberals can be fairly reliably detected? 
Some people say that all radicals or dissenters are actual 
or potential Communists or fellow travelers. If a person 
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denounces the capitalist system or race discrimination or the 
repression of civil liberties, these people argue, he is "prac-
tically" a Communist. 
Others argue, however, that to use Communism so loosely 
is to make the word meaningless. Many radicals, they point 
out, are as profoundly anti-Communist as are conservatives. 
Socialists, for example, oppose the capitalist system, and 
political repression; yet they believe in democracy, civil free-
dom and constitutional processes; and they are deeply hostile 
to the Communists. In Europe today the Socialists are a 
fundamental part of the anti-Communist coalition. It is in 
the countries where the Socialists are strongest-Britain, N or-
way, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Austria-that the Com-
m unists are weakest. 
How, then, to identify the Communist? The point to re-
member, this second group argues, is that Communists are 
not to be defined primarily by their attitude toward capital-
ism; since many people criticize capitalism who detest Com-
munism. Orthodox Communists are to be defined primarily 
by their attitude toward capitalism plus their attitude toward 
the U.S.S.R.-by the consistent shifts of their political line' in 
obedience to the policy of the Soviet Union. Fellow travelers 
are similarly to be defined by their acceptance of the thesis 
of Soviet infallibility in foreign affairs. 
If you find a man who believed strongly in collective se-
curity until August 1939, who then became an isolationist 
until June 1941, who then demanded a second front, and 
who now opposes the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic 
Pact, inveighs against Tito and supports the Progressive Party 
-if he meets not just one but all of these tests-then it is 
fairly safe to assume that you have found at least a reliable 
fellow traveler. 
Is the Communist Party a Political Party? 
The Communists claim to be a political party like any 
other. They feel therefore that they ought to be treated 
just as the Republicans, Democrats and Socialists are treated. 
Others feel that the Communist party is only in its ines-
sential part a political party and is in its essential part a 
clandestine conspiracy. Associate Justice Robert H. Jackson 
of the U. S. Supreme Court recently argued that there were 
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"decisive differences" between th Communist party and, say, 
the Republican or Democratic or Socialist parties, or H every 
other party of any importance in the long experience of the 
United States." These differences, he said, were (1) control 
of the party by a foreign government, (2) belief in the seizure 
of power by and for a minority rather than through free 
electoral processes, (3) commitment to violent and undemo-
cratic methods. Action taken against the Communist party, 
Jackson contends, would thereby provide no precedent for 
action against parties which do not meet these three points. 
Do the Communist Leaders Advocate the Overthrow 
of the Government by Force"? 
In the recent court trial the leaders of the Communist 
Party contended that it was a peaceful and constitutional 
party, dedicated to non-violent change. The government con-
tended that the leaders of the party taught and advocated the 
methods of violent revolution. The jury decided in favor 
of the government. The case has been appealed and will not 
be settled finally until the Supreme Court passes upon the 
constitutionality of the Smith Act under which the Com-
munist leaders were indicted. 
Other commentators have taken a position midway be-
tween that of the Communists and of the Department of 
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Justice. They argue that the attitude of the Communist 
leaders toward violence has been entirely opportunistic. The 
American Communists have advocated violent revolution, 
they claim, when the Soviet Union was ordering a policy of 
revolutionary extremism, and they have stopped advocating 
violent revolution when the Soviet Union called for a united 
front policy. While the Communists certainly have no ob-
jection in principle to the overthrow of governments by 
force, this does not necessarily mean that revolution is their 
specific policy at any given moment. 
These commentators make one other point: there is a 
profound difference from the viewpoint of law between an 
abstract belief in the inevitability, or even the desirability, 
of revolution, on the one hand, and concrete conspiratorial 
preparations for a revolutionary coup on the other. Thus 
Thomas Jefferson could speak of the usefulness of periodic 
revolution. Abraham Lincoln wrote, "This country with its 
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institutions belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever 
they shall grow weary of the existing government, they can 
exercise their constitutional right of amending it, or their 
revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it." John 
Dulles declared in 1949, "I don't believe that we need to have 
a violent revolution certainly not today. The people still 
have it in their power peacefully to check this thing, (statism) 
but if we don't do it and do it soon we will have to fight our 
way back, as Thomas Jefferson said, through revolution." 
Such statements as these, whether uttered by conservatives 
or by Communists, are quite different from the storing of 
arms, the secret drills, the cl~ndestine preparations for mili-
tary action. "The wide difference between advocacy and 
incitement, between preparation and attempt, between as-
sembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind," Justice 
Brandeis has written. In general, American law has sought 
to stop, not unpopular thoughts) but illegal acts. 
Are the Communists Agents of a Foreign Government? 
In order to avoid registration as foreign agents under the 
Voorhis Act, the American Communist Party disaffiliated 
itself in 1940 from the Comintern. The Communists claim 
today that they are serving the best interests of the American 
working class; and that the best way of serving working class 
interest anywhere is to protect and advance the cause of the 
Soviet Union. The American Communists are no more 
bound to the decisions of Moscow, they contend, than Ameri-
can Roman Catholics are to the decisions of Rome. 
Others, assert, however, that the Communist leaders in 
this country have acted effectively as, agents of the Soviet 
Union from the day the first Comintern representative dis-
embarked in New York, and that the relationship of blind 
obedience to every new phase of Soviet policy was not altered 
in the slightest by the formal act of disaffiliation from the 
Comintern in 1940, nor by the dissolution of the Comintem 
itself in 1943. On this basis, some people argue that the 
leaders of the party, at least, should be required to register 
under the Voorhis Act. The case of the Communists and 
Moscow is distinguished from that of the Catholics and Rome 
by pointing out that Catholic discipline is much less taut and 
all-embracing than Communist discipline. A Catholic, as a 
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citizen, must make decisions of living based on conscience and 
free will. Only under very grave circumstances is he excom-
municated. Thus Catholics could write to Cardinal Spellman 
criticizing his attacks on Mrs. Roosevelt without fear of 
penalty, whereas Communists who had dissented from the 
party leadership in such a manner would be expelled. 
It is not clear, however, that all ordinary Communists are 
to be considered as agents of foreign governments. "When 
we speak of the Communist party as a conspiracy directed 
by Moscow," ex-Communist Louis Bundez recently said, "we 
cannot realistically accuse every individual rank-and-file Com-
munist of being consciously in that conspiracy." Many were 
attracted by Communist cries against social injustice, only to 
discover that they were involved in defending even greater 
injustices. "This belated realization," says Bundez, is the 
reason why there are thousands of ex-Communists in America 
today, and why the turnover in Red membership is so high." 
Is uRed-Baiting" a Danger to Civil Liberties? 
The Communist themselves, and some non-Communist 
Americans, are bitterly critical of "red-baiting" -that is, 
attacks on Communists and the identification and exposure 
of Communist or pro-Communist activity. To attack Com-
munism in any way, it is said, is to weaken the cause of 
liberalism and to play into the hands of the fascists. 
Other Americans, however, inquire with skepticism why 
the Communists should be granted an immunity from cri-
ticism which the Communists would concede to no other 
group in society. Republican-baiting, Democratic-baiting, 
Catholic-baiting and so on seem to be fine from the Com-
munist viewpoint; so why should an exception be made for 
Communist-baiting? The attempt to forestall anti-Commu-
nist activity, then, is held to be a strategy of defense rathe~ 
than the application of any general principle. Moreover, 
agreement to this strategy, it is pointed out, means agreement 
to the general proposition that America is doomed to the 
choice between Communism and fascism, and that therefore 
to hurt one is to help the other. America is not condemned 
to so bleak a choice, these people argue; the proper Ameri-
can liberal position is to offer rigorous opposition to both 
Communism and fascism. 
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The problem is very different, however, when non-Com-
munist liberals are denounced as Communists by individuals 
opposed to all non-conformist or unpopular views. A democ-
racy deals with Communism by responsible debate and fact-
ual exposure. The method of the witch-hunt, with its reck-
less denunciations and unsubstantiated accusations, is gen-
erally adopted by those less interested in preserving a free 
society against Communism than in silencing all persons who 
disagree with them at whatever cost to freedom. These 
methods, especially when employed from the ambush of 
congressional immunity, are sometimes almost as dangerous 
to democracy as the methods of the Communists themselves. 
Should We Outlaw the Communist Party? 
Some people argue that the Communists have forfeited 
all claim to democratic treatment in this country, and that 
the interests of national security and of the preservation of 
freedom require that the Communist Party be outlawed. 
Other equally patriotic Americans, including President 
Truman, Governor Thomas E. Dewey and FBI Director J. 
Edgar Hoover, have opposed this proposal. They have op-
posed it in part because such action, short of a situation of 
genuine national emergency, would be contrary to the 
American tradition of civil freedom. They have opposed it 
in part also on practical grounds. When the Communist 
Party of Canada was outlawed, its leaders, after a due interval, 
set up a new party, called it the "Labor Progressive Party" 
and set it to doing business at the same old stand. The oppo-
nents of the illegalization of the Communist Party argue that 
such action has little effect unless accompanied by an arrest 
of the party's leaders and active members. Otherwise all that 
is outlawed is a name; and, at the same time, the Communists 
are provided with an issue tailor made to win them the 
sympathy of many Americans who see no national emergency 
justifying so sharp a contraction of political freedom. 
Should Communists be Permitted Full Freedom of 
Expression and of Political Action? 
Some argue that it is foolish to grant the Communists full 
freedom of action, when their only object is to use freedom 
in order to destroy it. Wherever they have achieved power, 
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it is pointed out, they have swiftly crushed out the right of 
political opposition. Why should we guarantee them the 
rights which they concede to no one else? Why should we 
give them the slightest opportunity to gain power in the 
U. S. and destroy freedoms for the rest of us? Thus many who 
do not advocate the open illegalization of the Communist 
Party feel, as does Senator Mundt of South Dakota, that Com-
munist activity should be weighted down by various legal 
disabilities so as to preserve the general freedom of society. 
The opponents of such proposals reply that our whole 
traditional conception of free society is based on a belief in 
the free competition of ideas. This does not mean, it is 
argued, just competition among the ideas we happen to like. 
Such a procedure would give the "we" group-i.e., whatever 
group happens to have power at a given moment-altogether 
too much control over the mind of the country. Hence basic 
to the conception of free society is what might be called the 
right to hold loathesome ideas. As Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes once said, "We should be eternally vigilant against 
attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe 
and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so immi-
nently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and 
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is 
required to save the country." 
The question to be faced, this group argues, is: in view of 
the Korean crisis is the present danger to our country from 
the Communist Party great enough to outweigh the dangers 
involved in the departure from our traditional principles of 
civil freedom? Do its ideas "so imminently threa,ten imme-
diate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of 
the law that an immediate check is required to save the 
country?" 
This test, as established by the Supreme Court, is known 
as the "clear and present danger" test. This phrase means 
that fresh speech can properly be suppressed only when it 
creates a clear and present danger, not just of changing some 
one's mind, but of bringing about "substantive evils" which 
the government may constitutionally seek to prevent. "It 
is only the present danger of immediate evil of an intent to 
bring it about," wrote Justice Holmes, "that warrants Con-
gress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion." "If 
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there be time to expose through discussion the falsehoods 
and fallacies," added Justice Brandeis, "to avert the evil by 
the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more 
speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify 
repression." 
Does t~is mean tp.at we are helpless before a conspiracy? 
Of course not, this group argues. Those who commit acts i,n 
violation of law must be swiftly punished. But having an 
ugly idea is not an act in violation of law. And trying to 
suppress that idea is really a vote of no-confidence in the 
strength of one's own democratic ideas. Does the present 
emergency, they ask, justify embarking on a national program 
of repression? 
Should Communists be Allowed to Work 
for the Government? 
Some people argue that, so long as mem bershi p in the 
Communist Party is legal, Communists should be allowed to 
work for the government like any other citizens. Even if it 
might not always 
be wise to employ 
Communists, they 
add, the policy of 
ferreting them 
out through in-
vestigation does 
far more harm 
than . the presence 
of a few Commu-
nists would do. 
Loyal ty in vestiga-
tions, they say, 
turn quickly into 
witch hunts which 
drive able men 
out of government 
and place a premium on timidity and mediocrity. 
But others contend that on the contrary, the right to work 
for the government is not one of the necessary rights of 
citizenship. "The petitioner may have a constitutional right 
to talk politics," observed Justice Holmes in deciding the 
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case of a policeman who had lost his job for political reasons, 
"but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." And 
clearly, the first condition of government employment is 
loyalty. As Roger Baldwin, former head of the American 
Civil Liberties Union, has put it, "A superior loyalty to a 
foreign government disqualifies a citizen for service to ours." 
It is conceded that difficult problems arise with the appli-
cation of this principle. Determinations of disloyalty are 
hard to make. Most people would agree that the witch-hunt 
approach to questions of loyalty in the government service 
can only result in injury to innocent people, confusion and 
demoralization. Most of these evils could be avoided loyalty 
investigations were limited to jobs genuinely related to the 
national security, and if the individual against whom the 
charges are made were granted the full and customary pro-
tections of Anglo-Saxon justice. In this way the essential 
goals of civil freedom and national security could both be 
safeguarded. 
Should Communists be Allowed to Teach in Our Schools 7 
Those who would exclude Communists as teachers in 
institutions of higher learning argue that a university is a 
community of scholars dedicated to free and disinterested 
inquiry; that intellectual integrity is incompatible with un-
declared or unknown loyalties; and that Communists by 
definition are thus disqualified from membership in an in-
tellectual community. They argue further that it has always 
been a prime Communist objective to gain influence over 
the youth of the country. 
Those who oppose the policy of exclusion argue that the 
benefits which a university might derive from expelling Com-
munists would be less than the disadvantages entailed by 
setting in motion the whole appalling machinery of investi-
gation, detection and trial. They point out that it is possible 
for teachers to be Communists without indoctrinating their 
students with Communism. Where the "clear and present 
danger" test might justify loyalty checks in government, these 
. persons say, it does not justify them in the colleges. The 
small number of pro-Communist teachers in the colleges, 
it is said, have had no kind of impact sufficient to provoke 
such drastic counter-measures; nor do they present any 
specific danger to national security. 
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Some people draw a distinction between colleges and pre-
college education. In college the student is relatively mature; 
he is exposed to severa,l different teachers; he can benefit by 
the cross-currents of opinion. In lower schools, however, 
the student is less mature and often is exposed to only a single 
teacher. In such circumstances, some people feel, measures 
should be taken particularly in the public schools, to insure 
that the immature student not be influenced by anti-Catholic, 
anti-semitic or pro-Communist teachers. Others continue to 
feel, however, that even in the lower schools the disadvantages 
of the machinery of detection outweigh the advantages gained . 
in ridding the schools of a few harmful individuals. 
Repression or Reform? 
Some feel that Communism can only be met in the last 
resort by police measure directed to the detention of Com-
munist leaders, the break-up of the party and the suppression 
of their means of propaganda and political action. 
Others feel that this approach treats symptoms, not causes. 
The symptoms must certainly be treated, particularly if they 
threaten to infect all of society; but this is not enough. The 
basic appeal of Communism, they feel, comes from the 
existence of poverty and injustice and from the frustration, 
drabness and insecurity of life for many people in our society. 
In the long run, they argue, we can defeat Communism in our 
midst only by removing the internal sources of its appeal. 
This means constructing a society of our own in which people 
will feel free, secure and strong-a society capable, moreover, 
of protecting itself against the external threat of aggression. 
Only by giving all those who dwell in our society a vigorous 
sense of belonging to it-of vital membership in it-can we 
finally destroy the roots of Communist power. 
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"MOSCOW'S EUROPEAN SATELLITES" 
The Annals, September, 1950 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science for September 1950 is a symposium of sixteen articles, 
each by a distinguished specialist. The general title is "Moscow's 
European Satellites", the contributions being grouped under 
three general headings: Background, Contemporary Trends 
Behind the Iron Curtain, and International Implications. 
Copies may be secured for only $2.00 each. Another pro-
cedure is to join The Academy (dues are only $5.00 per year) 
and receive six issues of The Annals, each a symposium on 
some social, political or economic topic. 
The American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 
38 17 Spruce Street 
Philadelphia 4, Pa. 
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